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Abstract 
One of the declared aims of the EU is to set up fair and well-functioning labour markets with 
the ultimate goal of creating better-performing economies and more equitable societies in Eu-
rope. The EU’s intervention is, however, grossly delimited by the competences and the auton-
omy retained by the Member States in the social domain as well as by the closely protected 
prerogative of the Member States to define the fundamental principles of the national system 
of social protection. Integration in the social field is also inhibited by the diversity of the insti-
tutional setups of local socio-economic models (capitalisms), which prevents institutional con-
vergence among the Member States. In this light, social integration in the EU, especially when 
designed to be implemented through binding legal regulation, faces considerable difficulties, 
which raises doubts about the level of integration achievable. This may well be particularly true 
for the recent initiative to revive the social dimension of European integration under the Euro-
pean Pillar of Social Rights,, which in the light of previous experiences has to overcome fun-
damental divergences of interests in the different Member States. 
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1 Introduction 
 
As a part of his political vision for the future of European integration, President Juncker men-
tioned in his 2016 State of the Union address that social injustice is still present in the EU and 
claimed that “Europe is not social enough” (European Union 2016). He, therefore, proposed 
the urgent establishment of a European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR). Shortly after, in April 
2017 the Commission made public a proposal for creating the EPSR, the declared general po-
litical aim of which was to introduce a set of key principles and rights capable of supporting 
fair and well-functioning labour markets in Europe with a view to creating ultimately better-
performing economies and more equitable societies. The implementation of these principles 
and rights at the national level came, however, with the caveat that they and their realisation 
should not affect the prerogatives of the Member States in determining the fundamental princi-
ples of national systems of social protection and defining their operation. Integration under the 
EPSR was, thus, subjected to the condition of respecting the different local institutional models 
(of capitalism) in the Member States and recognising the roles and the impact of that diversity 
in EU market integration. 
Such framing of the Commission’s policy proposal aiming to enhance the social dimension of 
EU integration did not come as a surprise. Integration in the social domain – often as regulated 
in law – has always been exposed to what domestic institutional models allowed and how their 
respective diversity, which emerged from the very different interests and needs appearing at 
local level, could be accommodated. The “European social landscape” was quite rightly claimed 
to be composed of various institutional designs of macro-economic, labour-market and social 
policies (Jepsen and Pascual 2005, 235). Moreover, the social domain in EU integration has 
traditionally been characterised by the Member States closely following European develop-
ments and actively safeguarding their autonomy in policy-making (Schiek 2017). Overall, na-
tional governments, bound by their political mandates and seeking re-election in the national 
political arena, are rather keen on preserving the relevant national competences and ensuring 
that competitiveness and local institutional designs are not damaged by the integration process. 
With this background, the EPSR, especially if it is implemented through binding legal rules, 
faces considerable difficulties in delivering its objectives and achieving the desired level of 
integration. 
The present chapter is structured as follows. First, it provides an overview of the progress of 
economic and social integration in Europe and the issues and dilemmas which led to the pro-
posing of the EPSR and the preparation of legislation thereunder. This prepares the discussion 
on differences in national economic models and their effect on social integration in the second 
part. The arguments made in this section are developed further by the examination of two case 
studies: one on the posting of workers and the other on the regulation of working time, the 
experiences from which are directly relevant for the EPSR and its prospects in a regional policy 
arena characterised by diverse national interests in the social field. 
 
2 The dilemmas of economic and social integration 
 
In the course of European integration, the economic and the social dimensions developed at 
different pace. The Treaty of Rome focused predominantly on the economic aspects of market 
integration. It was believed that the expected increase in productivity would lead to a parallel 
improvement of living and working conditions. The legal framework introduced for establish-
ing the “common market” allowed for little interference with national social policies, which 
were closely defended by Member States, and its development was, and still is, dominated by 
generating an “economic constitution” for EU market integration (Schiek 2017, 613). The bias 
towards the economic is also reflected in the provisions in the Treaties. The core legal obliga-
tions addressed to the Member States aimed at interfering with Member States’ policies so as 
to ensure that the freedoms of economic operators are adequately safeguarded. As a result of 
this “embedded liberalism” of EU integration guarantees for the free market were created at 
supranational level, while policies for the social domain were restricted (remained exclusively) 
at the national level (Giubboni 2006, 29). Despite the explicit commitment to promoting social 
development as a general political objective of the EU, the development of formalised instru-
ments, in particular with those of significant redistributive effect, was lagging far behind the 
opening up of national markets to international trade and competition. 
The main cause of the different pace and pathways of development of economic and social 
integration must be found in the national governments anxiously safeguarding – in the national 
interests – their autonomy in policy-making in the social domain. This is explained by, and has 
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led to the further entrenchment of, considerable differences across the European Union in re-
gards the concept and framework of social policy and the various entitlements and guarantees 
within (Schiek 2017, 613). Nor was social integration in the EU supported by active judicial 
involvement from the EU Court of Justice as it was experienced in the case of the enforcement 
of the fundamental economic freedoms of the Single Market. There was, however, the problem 
of the Court of Justice interfering, in the course of the interpretation of the fundamental free-
doms, with Member State social legislation and, thus, with national social models. From its 
perspective, any piece of national legislation, or any national rule or practice, which hinders or 
makes less attractive the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty,1 raises 
issues under EU law and may need to be “set aside” , even those which pursue genuine and 
legitimate social policy objectives (Schiek 2011, 27). It was raised in this connection that in the 
absence of EU level constitutional guarantees of social rights market integration diminishes the 
capacity of nation States to maintain, complementary to economic freedoms, social policy, 
which in fact is needed to maintain the social legitimacy of economic integration (Schiek 2017, 
613). 
The earlier mentioned constitutional asymmetry of EU integration, that while market integra-
tion enjoys constitutional protection, the social dimension was not offered a similar status, has 
its roots in the politico-historical context of European integration. On the one hand, there was 
initial agreement that there is no need to duplicate the system of rights protection available 
under the UN and the Council of Europe frameworks providing sufficient transnational stand-
ards. Reserving Union action to the economic also had the benefit of avoiding controversial and 
perhaps unnecessary interferences with the securely guarded national systems of social protec-
tion, labour law regulation and industrial relations. On the other, the earlier mentioned quasi-
Durkheimian premise was also broadly accepted that market integration will lead to speedy 
improvements in productivity, which will then guarantee an automatic increase in social stand-
ards, which was used to deny the need to address social rights and social protection at the Eu-
ropean level (Haas 1968). However, with the publication of the White Paper in 1985 it became 
apparent that market integration has considerable negative effects, felt at the level of national 
economies, such as the competitive advantages gained by countries with lower productivity 
costs and the downward pressure on local wages and national social standards (European Com-
mission 1985). At that time, however, the Member States were not prepared politically to trans-
fer competences in the social field to the Union, therefore, an alternative political avenue was 
sought in order to integrate social rights into the constitutional frame of rapidly expanding mar-
ket integration in Europe (Hatzopoulos 2012, 115). 
As well known, 1989 saw the adoption of the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social 
Rights of Workers.2 The charter, not dissimilar from the EPSR, set forth a principle-based cat-
alogue of the rights of workers. It was associated with two broader purposes. Firstly, the Mem-
ber States were assured that EU competences would not be extended in the area of social policy. 
Secondly, EU action to combat social dumping and protect minimum working conditions in the 
integrating European market was legitimised. The political momentum generated by the charter 
was used to launch a targeted programme of developing and, potentially, adopting legislative 
                                                          
1 Inter alia, Judgment of 30 November 1996, Gebhard, C-55/94, EU:C:1995:411. 
2 Final draft No. 9430/2/89 REV 2 SOC 370 (30 October 1989). 
and non-legislative measures in the social domain (Kenner 2003, 10–14). The charter, together 
with the European Social Charter, was the precursor of the economic and social rights included 
in the later adopted, now legally binding Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(EUCFR) (Sciarra 2008). The EUCFR contains an extensive, although far from comprehensive, 
list of social provisions (see Kenner 2003, 19; cf. Deakin 2003, 27). While politically it was a 
significant achievement, the normative relevance of these rights and principles is more doubtful 
as they seem to be regulated as non-justiciable norms and their implementation, in the very 
different national political and social contexts, is subject to the Member States exercising the 
competences reserved to them in these areas (Kenner 2003, 17). 
At the constitutional level, significant changes were brought about by the Lisbon Treaty. It 
introduced Article 151 TFEU on social policy which clarified the role of social partners in 
policy-making in this domain. Crucially, this provision provides an explicit recognition of the 
diversity of national systems and emphasises the autonomy of social partners. Article 3(3) TEU 
of the new Treaty framework identifies the social market economy as one of the core instru-
ments to further improve living standards in the EU and defines social policy as a shared com-
petence between EU and the Member States (Liebert 2011, 55). Nevertheless, it was still 
claimed that the EU continues to bear only a small share of this competence and that despite 
the repositioning of the social dimension in the Treaties social policy, as dictated by the political 
interests of the majority of the Member States, remains primarily within national competences 
(Piris 2010, 313). 
The political status quo was, however, shaken up by the global financial and economic crisis, 
the treatment of which in Europe, very often through austerity policies, brought light to the 
prevailing, and sharply increasing, inequalities in European societies and the inability of mar-
kets to provide an effective response (Eigmüller 2017, 353). It served as a stark reminder – even 
an “existential crisis” – for EU market integration and the Eurozone that they are failing to 
deliver on the core promises of the European Treaties (Deakin 2017, 194). The uneven distri-
bution of EU competences in the monetary, economic and social policy domains became a 
pressing issue preventing effective supranational responses and there was pressure on European 
politics to rethink the role of social policy as a production factor, implying that social protection 
need to be embedded in the process of economic integration (Deakin 2017, 202). The European 
Commission recognised this, and the social dimension was made the centrepiece of President 
Juncker’s political vision for the future of Europe (European Commission 2014; see also Euro-
pean Union 2016). 
The political determination of the Commission to address the social hiatus of market integration 
in the EU led to the formal delivery, after a broad public consultation, of the European Pillar of 
Social Rights in April 2017 (European Commission 2017a). The EPSR is now adopted as an 
inter-institutional proclamation among the Parliament, the Council and the Commission (Euro-
pean Parliament, Council and Commission 2017). It sets out 20 principles and rights to support 
fair and well-functioning labour markets and welfare systems pursuing the ultimate political 
objective of achieving better-performing economies and more equitable and resilient societies. 
They all have economic and social importance for the overall economic performance of the 
Member States. The EPSR mostly confirm rights that already exist in the EU and in the inter-
national acquis. For some particular fields, it adds, however, new elements supplementing the 
acquis and makes these rights more explicit. These areas focus on emerging social challenges, 
most notably new forms of employment triggered by the digital revolution. 
Three main areas of policy action are recognised in the EPSR. The first is equal opportunities 
and access to the labour market, which also covers skills development and life-long learning 
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and active support for employment, the increasing of employment opportunities, facilitating 
transitions between different employment statuses, and improving the employability of individ-
uals. The second concerns fair working conditions covering matters, such as establishing an 
adequate and reliable balance of rights and obligations between workers and employers as well 
as between flexible of working conditions and job security, facilitating job creation, job take-up 
and the adaptability of firms, and promoting social dialogue. The third policy domain is ade-
quate and sustainable social protection, which includes matters, such as access to high quality 
essential services, including childcare, healthcare and long-term care, ensuring dignified living 
and protection against risks, and enabling individuals to participate fully in employment and 
more generally in society. 
The EPSR places emphasis not only on the enumeration, but also on the potential implementa-
tion of the relevant rights and principles. It is made clear that they will gain normativity only 
through the individual pieces of legislation dedicated to their implementation, adopted either 
by the Union or individually by the Member States. Under this framework, the Member States 
and national social partners remain key actors responsible for securing the rights included in 
the EPSR. In the Commission’s view, implementation can take place using various means, such 
as legal regulation, social dialogue, policy guidance and recommendation, progress monitoring 
and financial support (European Commission 2017b) guaranteeing flexibility not only in terms 
of the instruments used in implementation, but also the actors involved. Much will depend on 
the outcomes of the ongoing wider discussion on future directions for EU integration (see Eu-
ropean Commission 2017c). 
There are, however, a number of already visible weaknesses of the EPSR affecting its credibil-
ity as a political measure as well as its implementation. It mostly repeats the existing social 
acquis and it is not especially ambitious in addressing many of the topical questions of social 
regulation.3 This might pose a dilemma for the Member State as to whether it encourages de-
regulatory changes in national law. The form found for the EPSR is also problematic. As an-
other document expressing political commitment in the EU to the protection of social rights, it 
may achieve very little beyond framing the policy and legislative efforts already in the pipeline. 
The realisation of its broader objective of creating a competitive social market and a well-func-
tioning welfare system requires a concentrated effort based on concrete, legally expressed and 
enforceable obligations capable of influencing the conduct of relevant actors, despite their com-
peting and/or contradictory interests. This is obviously the central dilemma of the EPSR as 
proposed by the Commission. As revealed by its preamble, the renewed commitment to the 
implementation of the rights enlisted was subjected to observing the diversity of national insti-
tutional models and respecting, in line with the principle of subsidiarity, the competences of the 
Member States in defining and delivering employment and social policies in their territory, 
including labour law and the organisation of national welfare systems. Viewed from the per-
spective of the institutional diversity of national economies and the different interests of na-
tional governments in maintaining local competitiveness and comparative advantages, this 
                                                          
3 For example, in connection with the issue of protection against unfair dismissal the EPSR makes only a general 
reference to a reasonable notice period and the right to (some) compensation, which falls short of the detail in other 
international norms, such as the ILO standards or the European Social Charter. 
amounts to an admission that the integration of the Member States under the EPSR will be 
rather limited. 
 
3 Varieties of local capitalisms and social integration in Europe 
 
As already raised, perhaps the most significant impediment to the integration of European mar-
kets and societies, if that is desirable politically or from a policy perspective, follows from the 
diversity of local economic (socio-economic) models and their particular institutional setups 
(see Leino 2017). This is explicitly recognised by the EPSR which makes the realisation of the 
common social objectives recognised subject to demonstrating due deference to Member State 
sovereignty and competences in the social domain as well as to the legitimate diversity of local 
models of capitalism. Politically, achieving any form or degree of (institutional) convergence 
among the Member States faces nearly insurmountable obstacles. National governments are 
closely safeguarding the local institutions which they consider as available to guarantee the 
competitiveness of the national economy and as capable of maintaining (comparative) ad-
vantages over other national economies. Hopes of social integration in Europe, even under the 
EPSR, must contend with the reality of institutional differences and competing differences. 
Earlier experiences with the adoption and the implementation of common rules affecting the 
social domain, namely the rules on the posting of workers and the regulation of working time, 
demonstrate with clarity the severity of political opposition and the hiatuses of the compromise 
solutions achievable in Europe. 
The institutional differences among national economies in Europe, which prevent meaningful 
progress is some of the core areas of EU integration, have been extensively analysed under the 
“varieties of capitalism” frame applied in political economy scholarship. The two major models 
identified among the group of large OECD countries are coordinated market economies4 and 
liberal market economies5 (Hall and Soskice 2001; see also Hall and Thelen 2009) (cf. Schnei-
der and Paunescu 2011; Bohle and Greskovits 2011) (cf. Esping-Andersen 1990; Sapir 2006) 
(cf. Sapir 2006; Baumol, Litan and Schramm 2007). A further six countries6 were placed in a 
more ambiguous category, the so-called “Mediterranean model”. Their key differences follow 
from the strategic interactions of economic actors that define the institutions of the particular 
regime; coordinated market economies and liberal market economies demonstrate significant 
differences in how they coordinate their respective institutional systems (Hall and Soskice 
2001).7 Importantly, it is not claimed that any of the models would be superior to another; both 
major types of capitalism have demonstrated their ability to ensure sustainable, satisfactory 
                                                          
4 Germany, Japan, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, and Austria. 
5 The U.S., Britain, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Ireland. 
6 France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Turkey. 
7 In coordinated market economies, firms rely mostly on non-market relationships when coordinating their ac-
tivities, depending on extensive information exchange and collaboration inside networks. These include relation-
ships through powerful employer associations, strong trade unions, large business networks. Their coordination is 
backed up by legal or regulatory systems which facilitate collaboration in such frameworks. Actors are encouraged 
to enter into collective bargaining and to conclude agreements with each other. Conversely, in liberal market econ-
omies the activities of firms are chiefly organised via competitive market arrangements and equilibrium is usually 
provided by demand and supply conditions in competitive markets. Instead of resorting to regulated coordination, 
economic actors remain in arms-length relationships with each other and their coordination takes place only in 
response to price signals. Their labour markets are characterised by a high degree of managerial prerogative on 
hiring and firing and by limited collective bargaining.  
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macroeconomic performance (Hall and Soskice 2001). The more nuanced clustering by Farkas,8 
following a restructuring of national economies after the global financial and economic crisis, 
which took into account the changes affecting employment relations and industrial relations in 
Europe, made the point that the differences between national economies can put European in-
tegration into jeopardy, especially if structural inequalities within the Union further deepened 
(Farkas 2016). On this basis, there is no rational ground for arguing that supranational frame-
works of economic governance, such as the EU Single Market, should favour one type of insti-
tutional arrangements over another. This is all the more so considering that there are consider-
able differences between individual national models as emerging in response to local interests 
and needs in their own particular socio-economic contexts, even within a single cluster of sim-
ilar national economies. 
The pitfalls of local institutional diversity for European integration have been recognised by the 
EU institutions as well as the possibility of mitigating them by the introduction of institutions 
at the European level (Delors Committee 1989). The latter is very much in line with general 
theorisation of the EU as an institutional actor; it was given the ability and the capacity to rec-
oncile in a political process differences among the Member States (Moravcsik and Schim-
melfennig 2009) and it has mandate and capacity to interfere with national governance and limit 
the ability of the Member States to pursue local interests, and, thus, to promote a particular 
model of economic structure (Christiansen et al 1999). This view is shared by analyses of insti-
tutional variety within the European Union holding that through EU-level institutions, for the 
sake of furthering integration, the behaviour of economic actors can be changed (Farkas 2016, 
504). 
The diversity of local economic models has had a palpable impact on the level and the modes 
of legal harmonisation achieved in the European Union (Leino 2017). In the matters, such as 
the prohibition of discrimination, or health and safety at the workplace, the approximation of 
national regulations has been very successful.9 In other fields, a less thorough harmonisation 
was accomplished through minimum standards, such as the restructuring of undertakings,10 the 
rights of workers engaged in atypical forms of work,11 and, not so successfully, working time.12 
                                                          
8 Farkas put the 25 European countries into 5 clusters based on the varieties in labour market flexibility (con-
sidering the proportion of part time and fixed term employment contracts) and industrial relations (especially trade 
union density and bargaining power). 
9 See, for example, Council Directive 89/391/EEC of 12 June 1989 on the introduction of measures to encourage 
improvements in the safety and health of workers at work, [1989] OJ L183/1. 
10 Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of 
undertakings or businesses, [2001] OJ L82/16. 
11 Council Directive 97/81/EC of 15 December 1997 concerning the Framework Agreement on part-time work 
concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC, [1998] OJ L14/9; Council Directive 98/23/EC of 7 April 1998 on the 
extension of Directive 97/81/EC on the framework agreement on part-time work concluded by UNICE, CEEP and 
the ETUC to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, [1998] OJ L131/10; Directive 
2008/104/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on temporary agency work, 
[2008] OJ L327/9. 
12 Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain 
aspects of the organisation of working time, [2003] OJ L299/9. 
In the domain of labour and employment law, national law remained the main source of regu-
lation allowing the Member States to push their national interests through the introduction of 
particular local institutional setups. For instance, the Member States are still entitled to lower 
standards in employment protection so as to gain a competitive advantage over other national 
economies in the Single Market. It was argued that this wide margin of regulatory local discre-
tion has led to indirect competition between Member States putting a downwards pressure on 
labour law protection in the different national economies (Verschueren 2015, 150). 
The dynamics of this framework have been largely affected by the intervention of the Court of 
Justice enforcing the fundamental freedoms in regards any national impediment to free move-
ment. The Court’s involvement was characterised above as controversial as it entailed the re-
duction of national policy autonomy in economic as well as other diffuse domains and has 
anchored the continuing dominance of the economic over the social in delivering EU market 
integration. In effect, by virtue of the legal doctrines of supremacy and direct effect governing 
the application and the enforcement of EU law in the Member States, individual economic op-
erators were empowered to challenge before national authorities and courts any piece of na-
tional economic and social regulation which affected their freedoms in the economic domain 
and the Court of Justice was invited to decide the fate of the contested national policy instrument 
as an “ultimate arbitrator” (see Schiek 2011). Because of scrutinising complex socio-economic 
policies through the narrow lenses of the fundamental economic freedoms, the Court’s activity 
attracted criticism for providing constitutional support to the ordo-liberal economic policy of 
European market integration and reducing the internal diversity which characterises the Single 
Market and which may be essential for its effective operation (see Schiek 2017, 621; see also 
the policy asymmetry argument in Scharpf 2009). The possibility of counterbalancing the 
Court’s influence by adopting social legislation was seen as holding its own risks as the com-
plexity of achieving political agreement among the Member States on social issues is likely to 
increase the weight of economic integration and will further inhibit the EU to become a social 
market economy (Schiek 2017, 614). 
The prospects for social integration in the EU in an environment characterised irreconcilable 
institutional divergences among the Member States was clearly demonstrated by the difficulties 
and conflicts encountered during the adoption of two landmark measures of EU policy activity 
in the social domain. Achieving political consensus among the Member States was impossible, 
which threatened with market integration progressing further without providing protection to 
the instruments of national social policy exposed to the deregulatory impact of the fundamental 
economic freedoms and without imposing limits to the curtailment of national social policy 
autonomy. Any future measure adopted under the EPSR is likely to face similar political and 
legal hurdles and limitations. 
 
3.1 The posting of workers 
 
The regulation of the posting of workers in the EU, for it to become politically acceptable for 
the Member States, had to reconcile the interests of very differently institutionalised national 
economies. On the one hand, there were the Member States that saw the key to competitiveness 
in lower wage costs and lower regulatory burdens. On the other, there were the Member States 
that intended to protect national labour markets by securing a certain level of living standards 
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for their workers. The disagreement was not simply economic; it affected fundamental ques-
tions of social policy available to be determined in national competences. The case for EU 
legislative involvement was quite evident as the free movement of services had been threatening 
the institutions of labour markets in the host Member States, the maintaining of which, if that 
was the case, and in this regard the boundaries between the respective competences of the Union 
and the Member States had to be clarified in law. Ironically, the conflict between host States 
and the posting countries did not cease after the adoption of common rules. The political stakes 
were too high, especially after the expansion of the number posting countries following the 
Eastern enlargement of the EU, with further deregulation demanded from high-regulation 
Member States. 
The EU measure adopted, the Posting of Workers Directive (PWD),13 is clearly the product of 
socio-economic heterogeneity within Europe in a domain where national economies exhibit 
evident institutional and other differences. Depending on the perspective, the PWD can be char-
acterised either as a minimum social policy instrument aiming to avoid social dumping with 
implications for the free movement of services, or a piece of economic regulation enabling 
economic operators to realise efficiency gains and national economies to boost their competi-
tiveness. Apparently, despite the evident impact of the PWD regulating the social dimension of 
EU market integration, it, especially in light of the relevant jurisprudence of the Court of Jus-
tice, encouraged labour market liberalisation in the Member States. To make matters even more 
complicated, the reception of the directive in individual Member States depended on the par-
ticular policy perspective from which it was viewed. The policy interests and needs of national 
governments can be rather different when they struggle to protect national labour markets and 
the related social policy mechanisms within the Single Market and when wish to profit from 
market integration in order to fulfil demands from economic areas facing underemployment. 
The Commission’s original proposal intended to alter the regulatory compromise established 
between posting and hosting States in the landmark decision of the Court in the Rush Portu-
guesa case.14 Hosting states used the judgment, which first addressed the conflict between the 
freedom to provide services and national labour law, to justify extending their national legisla-
tion and collective labour law agreements to cover posted workers and, thereby, maintain the 
variety of national labour laws despite the pressure to liberalise arising from EU legal obliga-
tions. In the Commission’s viewpoint, however, the Court’s ruling and its interpretation by the 
Member States damaged the free movement of services and led to a disproportionate application 
of national labour standards in the national territory (see Davies 2002). As revealed later in the 
preamble of the PWD, there was a clear need for clarifying at the European level the impact of 
the “transnationalisation” of employment relationships under the free movement of services 
national legislation on the applicable national legislation. 
In Article 3, the PWD regulated provisions concerning the terms and conditions of employment 
in the host Member State. This triggered a fierce dispute during the negotiations not only among 
the Member States, but also among the Commission, the Council and the Parliament, which all 
                                                          
13 Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the 
posting of workers in the provision of services, [1996] OJ L18/1. 
14 Judgment of 27 March 1990, Rush Portugesa, C-113/89, EU:C:1990: 142. 
took very different positions. The first contested issue concerned temporality. The original pro-
posal made a distinction between short-term posting, which is not longer than three months, 
where the freedom of movement should not be restricted, and long-term posting where the rules 
of the hosting State should be applied to posted workers, as permitted in the ruling in Rush 
Portuguesa. Finland, Germany, Austria, Luxembourg and France, however, pushed for more 
autonomy in regulating their national labour markets and the initial proposal for a three month 
period, during which the home State’s labour regulations must apply, was reduced to eight days. 
The second disputed issue concerned the scope of the Directive. Article 3(1) of PWD lists a 
number of mandatory rules providing minimum protection for posted workers. The Commis-
sion’s original proposal tried to keep these to the minimum. This, however, fell victim of the 
interests held by the Member States with a higher level of social protection. The Member States, 
keen on protecting national sovereignty in regulating labour markets and maintaining national 
institutional arrangements, managed to agree on granting a broad scope for the application of 
host States’ regulations (Davies 2008, 306). In its final version, Article 3(1) provides that the 
laws of the hosting States regarding maximum work periods and minimum rest periods, mini-
mum paid annual holidays, the minimum rates of pay, the conditions of hiring-out of workers, 
health and safety, the protection of pregnant women, women who recently gave birth, mothers 
and young people, and equality and equal opportunities are applicable to posted workers. It is 
quite clear, on this basis that the Commission failed to realise its original objective of departing 
in the interest of furthering market integration from the compromise struck in Rush Portuguesa 
(Martinsen 2015, 192). 
The compromise solution consolidated in the PWD was, however, unexpectedly challenged by 
the Court of Justice in a series of judgments, called infamously as the “Laval Quartet”15, prior-
itising the rights provided by the fundamental economic freedoms over the national regulation 
of labour markets. The Court’s intervention, labelled critically as “normative Darwinism”, was 
heavily criticised for disregarding the fundamental value of social solidarity and setting loose 
regulatory competition in social laws among the Member States (Supiot 2008, 6). In Viking, the 
Court had to resolve a conflict between the right to strike as provided in national law and free-
dom of establishment under Article 49 TFEU. While the judgment recognised the right to take 
collective action for the protection of the legitimate interests of workers as requiring protection 
under EU law, it ruled, when assessing the justifiability of the restriction resulting from the 
exercise of the right to strike, that under the proportionality principle the national court must 
consider whether the trade union had had less restrictive means at its disposal to settle its dispute 
with the employer (see Barnard 2008; Davies 2008).16 As an important preliminary matter con-
firming the exposure of local institutions to the liberalisation agenda of the fundamental free-
doms, the Court made it clear that social rights, such as the right to collective action fall under 
the scope of the free movement provisions and that the fundamental freedoms may indeed be 
invoked – horizontally – in regards the actions taken by trade unions (for a detailed assessment, 
see de Vries 2013, 175).17 
                                                          
15 Judgment of 11 December 2007, International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union 
v Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti, C-438/05, EU:C:2007:772; Judgment of 18 December 2007, Laval 
un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundets avdelning 1, By-
ggettan and Svenska Elektrikerförbundet, C-341/05, EU:C:2007:291; Judgment of 3 April 2008, Dirk Rüffert v 
Land Niedersachsen, C-346/06, EU:C:2008:189; Judgment of 19 June 2008, Commission of the European Com-
munities v Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, C-319/06, EU:C:2008:350. 
16 Judgment of 11 December 2007, International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union 
v Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti, C-438/05, EU:C:2007:772, paragraph 77. 
17 Ibid. paragraphs 56–66. 
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In the parallel judgment in Laval, the Court was equally pessimistic about the maintainability 
of national social standards. It held that the collective action initiated by the Swedish trade 
union constituted a violation of Article 56 TFEU, read together with Article 3 of the PWD, as 
it forced a service provider from another Member States to enter into negotiations and sign a 
collective agreement on the terms and conditions of employment (rates of pay) that were more 
burdensome to it than the minimum conditions legislated in the PWD.18 The Court also found 
that Articles 3(7) and 3(10) of the PWD regulating employment conditions did not provide any 
support to the application of the higher standards preferred by the local trade unions.19 The 
controversial position taken in the jurisprudence, which was interpreted as the Court taking side 
in the clash of neoliberal and regulated capitalisms within the EU, was not altered substantially 
in subsequent cases. In Rüffert, it held that the public procurement act of Lower Saxony consti-
tuted an unjustifiable barrier to the free movement of services, particularly because Member 
States may not adopt legislative measures which require that contractors for public work con-
tracts agree, in their tender submission, to pay their employees at least the rate set by a collective 
agreement.20 
The relevance of this jurisprudence for any rights-based anchoring of common social standards 
in Europe is that in the domain of EU law nothing prevents them being measured and balanced 
against the particular economic policy objectives enshrined in the fundamental freedoms, which 
may jeopardise their normative status as “fundamental” rights. In particular, the limited weight 
guaranteed to them in the proportionality test before the Court of Justice and the resulting lim-
ited opportunities for individuals (trade unions) to justify the exercise of those rights and its 
circumstances indicate that their impact is secondary and are applied as instruments of last re-
sort as opposed to granting them a privileged normative status (Martinsen 2015, 197). In gen-
eral, the judgments were received by the Member States as the economic directly threatening 
national labour and social constitutions. They asked the Commission repeatedly to revisit the 
issue. Criticisms were raised also by the Member States that in the political arena normally 
favoured the market liberalisation these rulings delivered. The UK and a number of Central 
European countries protested against the judgments claiming that the Court had unacceptably 
overridden the political consensus struck between Member States on these matters (Höpner and 
Schäfer 2012, 25). The Parliament and the trade unions asked the Commission to confirm that 
economic freedoms are not superior to fundamental social rights and that it recognised that 
trade unions have the right to defend workers (Martinsen 2015, 199). 
The political consolidation of the jurisprudence’s widely criticised developments was attempted 
a few years after by the Commission when it presented a proposal for an enforcement directive 
on the posting of workers. The proposal basically confirmed the principle laid down in Viking 
and Laval (European Commission 2012a). Interestingly, the Commission made another pro-
posal at the same time concerning the adoption of a regulation on the right to take collective 
action, the so-called Monti II regulation (European Commission 2012b). The Commission’s 
plan was received with considerable hostility by the Member States which were anxious to 
                                                          
18 Judgment of 18 December 2007, Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska By-
ggnadsarbetareförbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan and Svenska Elektrikerförbundet, C-341/05, EU:C:2007:291, 
paragraph 99. 
19 Ibid. paragraphs 79–85. 
20 Judgment of 3 April 2008, Dirk Rüffert v Land Niedersachsen, C-346/06, EU:C:2008:189, paragraph 39. 
protect locally regulated social rights from the influence of the fundamental freedoms. They 
applied, for the first time of the history of the EU, the subsidiarity early warning mechanism 
provided in the Lisbon Treaty to national parliaments. Twelve national parliaments, the Danish, 
Finnish, Swedish, Latvian, Portuguese, Luxembourgian, Maltese, Polish, French, Belgian, Brit-
ish and the Dutch, submitted reasoned opinions forcing the Commission to withdraw the pro-
posal. 
With this background, it is understandable that during the renegotiation of the PWD the revis-
iting of the social aspects was politically impracticable. The Member States focused merely on 
the enforcement technicalities of the directive aiming to improve its implementation and appli-
cation at the national level. The two main areas addressed were the administrative and control 
measures available to the Member States to adopt and the regulation of liability between con-
tractors and subcontractors. The compromise achieved in Directive 2014/67/EU21 demonstrates 
that Member States may indeed be willing reach higher than the lowest common denominator 
and agree on common arrangements affecting national social policy. The non-exhaustiveness 
of the list of control measures drafted and the voluntary nature of the principle of joint and 
several liability for subcontractors do confirm, however, that there are obvious limitations to 
such agreements among the Member States. Twenty-five Member States voted in favour of the 
compromise solutions enacted in the Enforcement Directive, including countries which had 
formerly opposed them, such as the UK and Poland, while Hungary, Latvia, and Estonia, anx-
ious to protect regulatory autonomy and, with that, the competitiveness of local labour markets, 
rejected it. 
Because of the tensions caused at the local level and between Member States, the revision of 
the PWD remained on the agenda even after 2014. Changes were proposed especially in the 
area of the remuneration of posted workers as well as concerning subcontracting, temporary 
agency work and long-term posting. During the public consultation period, the Commission 
received two joint letters from national governments.22 The letter signed by Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden urged the modernisation of the 
PWD and raised, among others, that the principle of “equal pay for equal work in the same 
workplace” needs to be introduced as a basis of participation in national labour markets. They 
also suggested that the provisions regarding working and social conditions, most notably remu-
neration, applicable to posted workers should be amended and widened and that the establish-
ment of a maximum temporal limit to postings should be reconsidered. The other letter was 
signed by Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Romania 
and Slovakia. As driven by their particular local (economic) interests, they argued that the re-
vision of the PWD was premature and should be postponed until the Enforcement Directive’s 
effects are carefully evaluated and assessed. They also reminded the Commission that the prin-
ciple of “equal pay for equal work in the same workplace” may be incompatible with the Single 
Market as pay rate differences play a significant role in the competition among service provid-
ers. Furthermore, they claimed that posted workers need to remain under the legislation of the 
sending Member State for purposes of social security. 
The Commission’s response to these diametrically opposing national positions raised consider-
able controversies. Observing its own political mandate, the Commission considered that the 
                                                          
21 Directive 2014/67/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the enforcement of 
Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services and amending 
Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012 on administrative cooperation through the Internal Market Information System, 
OJ L 159, 28.5.2014, p. 11–31. 
22 Briefing EU Legislation in Progress Posting of Workers Directive, European Parliamentary Research Service, 
Monika Kiss, Members’ Research Service, PE 582.043. 10 May, 2016. 
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principle of “equal work for equal pay in the same workplace” is a cornerstone of the “social 
pillar” of European market integration and stressed that the Single Market must provide fairer 
conditions for workers and companies (European Commission 2016a). Its legislative proposal 
(European Commission 2016b) clearly favoured the strengthening of the social rights of posted 
workers and, to his effect, the autonomy of the hosting country to enforce its regulatory stand-
ards. It proposed, in particular, that the remuneration and allowances payable in the hosting 
Member States would not only include the minimum rates of pay, but also other elements, such 
as bonuses or allowances, if applicable. The Commission also proposed allowing the Member 
States make rules set out in law or in universally applicable collective agreements to become 
mandatory for posted workers in all sectors and introduce obligations on national and cross-
border subcontractors to grant their workers the same pay as the main contractor. The proposal 
also contained provisions granting more favourable conditions for workers hired out by tempo-
rary agencies and those whose posting lasts longer than 24 months. 
Frustrated by the Commission’s proposal, the Member States yet again resorted to the subsidi-
arity control mechanism. Eleven national parliaments, those in Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia sub-
mitted reasoned opinions. Some of the criticisms were formal, others were substantive. As a 
main substantive hiatus, the Czech Republic and Estonia raised that the introduction of an 
“equal pay for equal work” principle setting out that posted workers will generally benefit from 
the same rules governing pay and working conditions as local workers could cause competitive 
disadvantages for workers and service providers from the newer Member States where labour 
cost is generally lower, as pay rate differences constitute one legitimate element of competitive 
advantage for service providers. Slovakia asked for a more balanced approach which takes into 
account the different levels of development in and the specific characteristics of the newer 
Member States. Denmark claimed that while the current directive holds explicitly that pay and 
working conditions should be regulated at national level, the proposed revision contains no such 
provision. Other, perhaps less  
+relevant substantive demands included that subcontractors from other Member States should 
be required as a general principle to observe requirements laid down in legislation, regulatory 
instruments and collective agreements in the Member State concerned and that the Member 
States should be confined in their right to decide whether posted workers employed by tempo-
rary work agencies must meet the requirements specified in Directive 2008/104/EC on tempo-
rary agency work.23 
The proposal, which was declared by the Commission as compatible with the principle of sub-
sidiarity and was left unchanged, proceeded to the Council. There, the Member States agreed 
on the key principle of “equal pay for equal work in the same workplace” and they also accepted 
that all terms and conditions relating to employment in the host country should apply in the 
case of postings exceeding 12 months (which timeframe can be extended to 18 months). In 
reaching its decision, the Council presumably paid close attention to the circumstance that pay 
levels and employment protection as well as production costs vary greatly among the Member 
                                                          
23 Directive 2008/104/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on temporary 
agency work; OJ L 327, 5.12.2008, p. 9–14. 
States and will continue to be different. The differences between production costs in the differ-
ent Member States follow from local factors, such as the means and techniques of production, 
or the skills and training level of employees. This proved to be controversial as commentators 
argued that differences in wages and the level of employment protection between the “old” and 
the “new” Member States no longer bear such political relevance as a result of pay levels rising 
sharply in Central and Eastern Europe in the first decades of the 21st century (see Bernaciak 
2014). It is difficult to contest, however, that there remain Member States, such as the United 
Kingdom, Ireland and Luxembourg that derive considerable competitive advantages from their 
flexible labour market and the connected weak system of employment protection and low fiscal 
burdens on employment, where economic stakeholders (employers) actively support legal ar-
rangements which enable them to exploit differences in pay levels within the Single Market. In 
parallel, the Member States with labour shortages in the national economy have become in-
creasingly wary of the ability of other Member States to deprive them of their badly needed 
workforce. Any move, especially legislative developments at the EU level aiming to introduce 
common institutions which would enhance the protection of workers in cross-border situations, 
therefore, continue to be eyed with suspicion fearing that reductions in the heterogeneity of 
local institutions would diminish the competitive advantages of national economies. In such a 
policy environment characterised by closely observed powerful national interests and equally 
powerful legal obligations, as imposed by EU law and interpreted by the EU Court of Justice, 
it is rather doubtful that initiatives for the protection of the social rights of workers, such as the 
EPSR, will be able to make a meaningful impact, unless their “fundamental” nature is taken 
seriously by decision-makers as well as stakeholders in the national economy. 
 
3.2 The regulation of working time 
 
Regulating working time at the European level, which again lies at the intersection of competing 
objectives brought by the Member States to the EU policy framework, is another field where 
institutional differences in the Member States manifesting in very different national economic 
interests had an impact on the common solutions achievable. As a specificity of the concrete 
regulatory domain, the EU has rather explicit competences to support and complement the ac-
tivities of the Member States concerning the health and safety of workers (Article 137 TFEU). 
As a further fundamental legal provision, Article 31(2) EUCFR holds that every worker has the 
right to limited maximum working hours, daily and weekly rest periods and an annual period 
of paid leave, providing a general rights-based frame for the EU’s policy activities.24 The dif-
ferent interests held by the Member States have, nevertheless, led to a dynamic and controver-
sial development of activities at the EU level characterised by frequent conflicts between law 
and politics as delivered by the EU institutions and the different Member States (Nowak 2008, 
448). The troubled history of the harmonisation of working time in the EU might have impacted 
the EPSR which carefully avoids mentioning working time specifically despite its general ob-
jective of guaranteeing fair conditions in labour markets. 
                                                          
24 Ironically, the EPSR refers only to Article 31(2) EUCFR concerning the right of workers to working condi-
tions which respect his or her health, safety and dignity. 
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The Working Time Directive (WTD), as a major piece of EU social legislation, managed, de-
spite strong opposition from the Member States, to introduce fairly significant common stand-
ards for national labour laws. The general aim of the original 1993 directive25 was to improve 
the health and safety of workers by setting minimum standards for the organisation of working 
time. It gave a right to workers to a minimum daily rest period of eleven consecutive hours in 
a twenty-four hour period, a rest break if the working day exceeds six hours, and – in addition 
to the eleven hour daily rest – a minimum uninterrupted rest period of twenty-four hours in each 
seven-day period, which, in principle, include Sunday. It restricted the maximum weekly work-
ing time to an average of forty-eight hours and provided for a maximum paid annual leave of 
four weeks. It regulated the possibility that weekly working time can be extended beyond 48 
hours with the consent of the individual worker. The reference period for the calculation of the 
average weekly working time was set at the rate of not more than four months. The WTD also 
regulated night work, shift work and patterns of work. It gave a legislative definition of work 
(“any period during which the worker is working, at the employer’s disposal and carrying out 
his activity or duties, in accordance with national law and/or practice”) and rest period (“any 
period which is not working time”). 
In the course of its adoption, the Member States had to address disagreements on three major 
regulatory issues. These were the legal basis available for the adoption of the directive, the 
definitions of working time and the possibility of individual Member State opt-outs from the 
provisions of the directive. Concerning the issue of the legal basis, the source of conflict among 
the Member States emerged from the introduction of former Article 118/A TEC (now Article 
153(1) TFEU by the Single European Act, which provided that measures aiming to improve 
health and safety at work can be adopted by qualified majority voting in the Council preventing 
that individual Member States, such as the UK holding particularly strong interests in the do-
main, block decision-making. It was, in fact, the UK which made use of the political opportu-
nities to increase the flexibility of the directive’s rules, for example by introducing the opt-out 
from the provision on the maximum 48 hour workweek allowing that workers and employers 
make an agreement that that rules does not apply to them (Article 18(b)(1)). A further opt-out 
concerned the exemption of specific sectors from the scope of the directive, which was delim-
ited in time and subjected to a review after seven years.26 
The political rationale for introducing flexible arrangements was to secure the support of every 
Member State for the directive and to be able to hammer out agreements among them on the 
lowest common denominator in regulation (Martinsen 2015, 106). Nevertheless, the UK de-
cided not to give its approval to the final directive and abstained from the final vote in the 
Council (see Beach 2001, 156). It immediately brought a legal challenge to the Court of Justice 
in an action for annulment claiming that the directive was adopted using an incorrect legal 
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basis.27 The Court did not share the British concerns and held that the directive was valid.28 It 
did accept, however, that the provision on including Sunday in the weekly rest period (Article 
5) cannot be connected to health and safety protection. 
Concerning the definition of work, the conflict between the common institutional arrangements 
and the particular interests of the Member States materialised only after the Court of Justice 
interpreted, rather expansively, the directive’s relevant provision in its judgment in SiMAP.29 
The Court not only established that doctors, despite Article 2(2) of the directive allowing the 
exemption of public service activities necessary to maintain public order and security, were 
covered by the directive, but it also held that on-call time spent at a healthcare institution, as 
opposed to on-call duty during which the doctor was not required to be at the healthcare insti-
tution, constituted working time. The judgment caused a political uproar in the Member States 
which reacted to it without hesitation. Germany refused to acknowledge that the judgment de-
livered in a Spanish case had a general legal effect. In its official communication, the Ministry 
of Labour stated that the ruling did not apply to Germany even though the applicable Spanish 
and German regulations were quite similar (Nowak 2008, 456). In a joint letter sent to the Com-
mission, the health ministers of the UK, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands raised their 
political concerns about the impact of the ruling (Martinsen 2015, 110). Also, there was con-
siderable confusion as to whether the judgment applied only to the medical sector, or the prin-
ciple laid down covered other sectors as well, such as the fire service, the fishing industry, 
boarding schools, the police, the defence sector etc. (European Commission 2010b). The Ger-
man government released a calculation demonstrating that implementing the Court’s interpre-
tation would increase the staffing requirement in German hospitals by 24 per cent and would 
lead to an additional cost of roughly EUR 1.75 billion (European Commission 2003). 
From the perspective of the political opportunities available to the Member States to protect the 
institutional setup of the national economy, the Court’s interpretation seemed to overrule the 
compromise institutional solution secured in the directive. This worry was not, however, shared 
by the Commission which in its evaluation report on the WTD refused to deal with the issue 
(European Commission 2000). Arguably, the Commission wanted to avoid using the SiMAP 
ruling with the potential effect of challenging the Member States which were concerned about 
the market-limiting effect of the directive (Martinsen 2015, 110). Contrary to expectations, the 
revised directive did not tackle policy and legal uncertainty caused by the judgment and the 
new legislative text (Directive 2003/88/EC) omitted to make a reference to the Court’s inter-
pretation. It seems that the Member States finally accepted that the judgment offered a valid 
reading of the directive’s provisions and the intent of the EU legislator. 
In the meantime, the Court of Justice not only confirmed in subsequent case law the confirmed 
the principles laid down in SiMAP,30 but offered further controversial interpretation of the di-
rective contradicting in law the political positions held by the Member States, including the 
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29 Judgment of 3 October 2000, Sindicato de Médicos de Asistencia Pública (Simap) v Conselleria de Sanidad 
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most powerful (Martinsen 2015, 104). In the British trade union case BECTU, it held that work-
ers on short-term contracts are entitled to paid annual leave under the directive.31 In Jaeger, it 
became evident that the Court’s interpretation of working time applies in every labour market 
in the EU. In regards the specific legal issue whether whether time spent on call, but spent 
inactively, was considered working time, even though the employer (here, a doctor) was able 
to rest during that period, it ruled that on-call time was generally working time for the reason 
that the employee had to be at the disposal of the employer.32 This had significant impact in 
national health care systems as many employees were considered to be employed over 48 hours 
in a week, addressing which – as predicted earlier by the German government – had serious 
financial implications. 
The third issue raising political controversies among the Member States concerning the opt-
outs available the Member States was also linked to the interpretation given in SiMAP. The 
judgment was ignored by many Member States which failed to implement it into national law 
(Martinsen 2015, 113). Threatened with procedures for non-compliance, the Member States 
decided to rely on the opt-out offered in the directive enabling national governments to protect 
the competitiveness of the national economy by enabling employers to organise working time 
flexibly and, thus, control wage expenditures.33 The use of the opt-out attracted considerable 
political attention in Europe as it had the effect of splitting the political space and putting Mem-
ber States with different economic interests on a collision course (Martinsen 2015, 107). The 
liberal market economies in the EU regarded the WTD and its implementation as obstacles to 
economic growth and as unjustifiably interfering with the untrammelled operation of the market 
where the freedom of employers to make choices must be preserved (see Copeland 2012). In 
contrast, Member States with regulated market economies held the position that regulating 
working hours will the effect of creating more employment and guaranteeing the physical and 
mental health of the workforce. In their view, it is the responsibility of the government to ensure 
through regulatory intervention that employees earn sufficient income without working exces-
sively long hours (see Copeland 2012). 
The open rebellion of the Member States against a core provision of the directive and the polit-
ical schism revealed by the related use of the opt-out provided convinced the Commission, 
driven mainly by its worries that the realisation of important EU policy objectives will be jeop-
ardised, that the Member States need to be invited to renegotiate their obligations as affected 
by the jurisprudence of the Court (Martinsen 2015, 117). The Member States in the Council 
supported the Commission’s decision. The political deal reversing legal developments was, 
however, undermined by the intervention of the European Parliament which entered the politi-
cal arena as an actor committed to strengthen the protection of social rights. It was in favour of 
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keeping the Court’s interpretation and codifying it into EU legislation. The involvement of so-
cial partners in the negotiation process by the Commission also proved to be problematic as 
their interests quite plainly contradicted each other. The European Trade Union Confederation 
(ETUC) firmly opposed the prolongation of the opt-outs and argued for modifying the directive 
of the basis of the Court’s case law. The ETUC rejected the compromise solution emerging 
from the negotiations and decided, finally, to refuse to respond to the Commission’s calls. With 
the review of the directive stalled, the Commission was subjected to strong criticism for not 
responding in time to the new situation arising after SiMAP, failing to understand the depth of 
the political divisions in Europe on this matter, and, finally, for disregarding the political posi-
tion taken up by the European Parliament (Martinsen 2015, 131). 
The national reactions to the SiMAP ruling demonstrated with clarity the obstacles to economic 
and social integration in the EU. As a matter of the regulation of working time, national labour 
markets remain deeply divided by substantive differences (see Eurofund 2015). One of the key 
division is between the “old” and the “new” Member States. While in most of the pre-2004 
Member States the main working time standards were created together with social partners at 
sectoral or at company level, in the newer Member States, with the exception of Cyprus, the 
rules were developed in a top-down legislative process without resorting to the largely dysfunc-
tional tool of collective bargaining (see Eurofund 2016; Eurofund 2017). The opt-out enabling 
employers and employees to agree on longer working hours was preferred by national econo-
mies interested in maintaining labour market flexibility and high productivity. Other national 
economies preferred solutions which ensured productivity through innovation and new forms 
of work organisation, and aimed to guarantee high standards of health and safety at the work-
place and a work-life balance for workers (see Eurofund 2015; European Commission 2010). 
As a further consequence of the attempt to harmonise the regulation of working time in Europe, 
relevant for future initiatives for regulating social rights at the EU level, that the extensive opt-
out framework allowed so as to enable agreement among the Member States created a set of 
rules that “nobody follows”, undermining fundamentally the credibility of European Union 
measures and expectations of effectiveness from rule-based governance in the EU (Martinsen 
2015, 131). 
The regulation of work-life balance, affecting working time and leaves from work, revealed 
largely similar tensions among the Member States.34 Apart from raw national economic interests 
relating to competitiveness, growth and productivity, a range of other factors, such as social 
attitudes and workplace culture affected the position taken by national governments. It was 
noted in connection with the first maternity leave directive that its implementation, even though 
the overall economic impact in terms of costs was rather modest, led to considerable adaptation 
pressure in different Member States. While the misfit in coordinated market economies and in 
the Mediterranean countries was not extreme, adaptation requirements in liberal market econ-
omies were considerable (see Falkner et al 2002). Some of the Member States were rather re-
luctant to reshape their already existing systems of parental leave which use significantly dif-
ferent rules in determining entitlement on the basis of the age of the child or enabling the 
individualisation of entitlements and their transferability (European Parliament, 2015). It was 
hardly surprising that the Council, due to the lack of agreement among the Member States, 
blocked the Commission’s proposal to modify the directive on maternity leave. The proposal 
submitted under the EPSR for a work-life balance directive seems to have learned from the past 
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and, in principle, commits to respecting the different interests and the different institutional 
arrangements of individual Member States. Its fairly ambitious provisions, which also touch 
upon issues of social security, may, however, raise objections from the Member States,35 ques-
tioning again the ability of Europe to integrate under the social rights it aims to provide to its 
workers. 
 
4 Conclusion 
 
Social integration is an area of politics and law in the European Union where the interests held 
by the Member States as well as their differences play an obvious and extremely influential 
role. This is evidenced in the politics leading to the adoption of EU measures in the social 
domain, in the individual provisions of the measures adopted, and in Member State approaches 
to the implementation of those measures in the national territory. The different national econo-
mies, including national labour markets, tolerate the introduction of common institutions at the 
European level differently, which has an impact on the prospects of adopting European rules as 
well as on the preparedness of the Member States to alter local institutional setups under their 
EU obligations. EU policy-making, therefore, navigates in a very difficult terrain where it is 
required to reconcile multiple factors, which may often be in a contradictory relationship with 
each other, such as the agenda of market integration, the EU’s complex economic policy 
agenda, its political and legal commitment to protecting social rights, and the legitimate de-
mands from national governments to be able to maintain the competitiveness of the national 
economy. The compromise solutions achievable in such an environment are unlikely to meet 
expectations and may lead to further conflicts, or accentuate existing ones, among the different 
actors. 
This is the political and legal domain in which the Commission proposed to develop and im-
plement a European Pillar of Social Rights. While at the level of high politics the EPSR, which 
demonstratively made deference to national competences and local policy and institutional di-
versity and incorporated the principle of subsidiarity, managed to gather support from the Mem-
ber States and other actors, its implementation in legal measures containing detailed rules will 
very likely attract serious opposition, especially from the national governments the economic 
policy interests of which those measures jeopardise. The divisions are likely to arise between 
liberal and regulated market economies as well as between national economies which aim to 
ensure productivity and competitiveness through flexible labour markets and which want to 
guarantee the same whilst guaranteeing a higher standard of protection to the social rights of 
workers. As shown by previous examples, introducing flexibility into the EPSR framework so 
as to accommodate such differences may have the consequence of jeopardising the attainment 
of its objectives. Also, the using of a rights-language may not prove to be as effective as ex-
pected in overcoming the political impasse among the Member States and the relevant social 
partners. Unless their “fundamental” nature is recognised and given effect, the protection of 
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social rights in a separate pillar will be unsuccessful in challenging the current policy/political 
status quo defining EU market integration. 
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